On October 11, 2016, four individuals shut down the Enbridge oil pipelines running through Clearwater County. These four individuals traveled to the small town of Leonard, Minnesota, and cut their way into the valve station. Two of them accessed the shut-off valve, while one videotaped. The last individual contacted Enbridge, so the company had the opportunity to remotely shut down the pipelines. All four individuals were ultimately arrested and charged with felonies.
However, these four defendants did not enter the valve station and force the shutdown of the pipelines for their own benefit. Instead, they were engaged in an act of civil disobedience—they broke the law for a greater good by seeking to prevent the global harm caused by fossil fuels. One of the defendants, Annette Klapstein explained, civil disobedience is “the only thing we have left as ordinary citizens when our political system will not respond to a crisis that is actually threatening the very existence of our grandchildren.” Despite this sincere belief, there are slim protections for people like Annette Klapstein who act on their convictions.
The Clearwater County defendants resorted to the protections afforded by the necessity defense. In Minnesota, the necessity defense is generally unavailable where there are alternative legal remedies, including access to the political system. The four Clearwater County defendants were fortunate in that the Minnesota Court of Appeals allowed them the opportunity to present their necessity defense, although the trial judge ultimately granted their motion for a judgment of acquittal before they had the opportunity to present the necessity defense in court. Nonetheless, the opportunity to present a necessity defense is exceedingly rare for acts of civil disobedience.
Those who commit genuine acts of civil disobedience deserve more protection than the meager options currently available. Civil disobedience must be recognized as an appropriate means of engaging in the constitutionally protected expression of political dissent. Individuals who engage in valid acts of disobedience must be permitted to assert civil disobedience as a defense to reduce the punishment they receive for expressing political dissent through communicative acts. Embracing such a use of civil disobedience would not eliminate a criminal conviction, but would instead reduce a convicted defendant’s punishment. This method thus demonstrates respect not only for the rule of law, but also for the important place civil disobedience holds in society.
In Part II, this note provides the theoretical basis for a judicially manageable definition of civil disobedience: namely, that a valid act of civil disobedience exists where there is an unjust government act that necessitates active disobedience. Part III provides support for the protection of active political dissent from Supreme Court decisions regarding the First Amendment, draft evasion, and the civil rights movement. Part IV describes how civil disobedience, as a means to reduce sentencing, does not run afoul of established notions of criminal intent. It also discusses civil disobedience as a viable alternative to the necessity defense. Lastly, Part V uses the Clearwater County case as a practical example of how civil disobedience may be asserted. In sum, this note provides support for the notion that a person who violated a government act—one that a reasonable person would find to be unjust and that necessitated direct action to end that injustice—should be allowed to present a defense arguing for reduced or nominal punishment.