In Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the challenge of determining whether a Minnesota vehicle forfeiture statute violated due process in light of an eighteen-month delay between the seizure of a vehicle and the post-seizure hearing. Megan Olson, a repeat driving-while-impaired (DWI) offender and the daughter of Helen Olson, was driving her mother’s car when she was arrested for a fourth DWI offense. This resulted in the seizure of the vehicle, despite the fact that the driver was not the owner.
Minnesota’s forfeiture statute required that Megan’s pending criminal proceeding be resolved before the forfeiture action could begin, which contributed to the eighteen-month delay. The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute on its face and as applied to Megan, the non-owner driver. However, the majority ruled that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Helen, the alleged innocent owner of the vehicle. The court reached its decision by applying the analytical test from Mathews v. Eldridge, which concerned process before the termination of Social Security disability benefits, rather than Barker v. Wingo, which involved the constitutionality of a delay prior to a criminal trial.
This case note begins with a discussion of the judiciary’s controversial efforts to navigate the complexities of the variable and unpredictable procedural due process doctrine. A brief overview of procedural due process in the context of civil forfeiture follows, with an explanation of the commonalities between civil forfeiture and criminal law. The use of the Mathews framework and Barker factors in procedural due process, specifically in Minnesota, are also discussed. Next, the facts and procedural history of Olson follow, along with an explanation of the majority’s decision.
This note then continues with an analysis of the constitutional test employed in Olson, arguing that the use of the Barker factors would have been more appropriate because of the quasi-criminal nature of civil forfeiture along with the United States Supreme Court’s application of Barker for this specific forfeiture issue. The note goes on to examine the Minnesota Supreme Court’s erroneous decision in applying the Mathews framework—because of the court’s desire to follow Minnesota precedent—and disregarding the differences between private property and administrative benefits. Subsequently, the note argues that Olson, if decided under the Barker factors, would likely have held the forfeiture statute constitutional as applied to both Megan and Helen. This result is then compared with the outcome for innocent owners generally, arguing that Barker provides a stronger claim for these individuals. Finally, this case note concludes with a discussion of the implications of the Olson ruling on future cases in Minnesota.