Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing;
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
Since the inception of the United States, the relationship between government and religion may be best characterized as a balancing act. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution unequivocally affirms an individual’s right to exercise his religion; yet, at the same time, it forbids the government from favoring one religion over another or favoring religion over non- religion. Although some have recognized the seemingly paradoxical nature of the combination of the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses, government and religion have, for the most part, coexisted comfortably.
The United States has thrived as a nation that respects both the law of the land and one’s right to practice religion. However, the law of the United States and the teachings of one’s religion can, at times, be at odds. And while the judiciary generally precludes itself from adjudicating matters of an ecclesiastical nature, religion cannot always evade the authority of secular law.
The First Amendment also protects freedom of speech. While many have touted the benefits of a populace that promotes free speech, certain types of speech have been deemed unworthy of the First Amendment’s protections. The Supreme Court has, with qualification, rejected the notion that defamatory statements should be constitutionally protected. There is, after all, great value in one’s name and reputation.
In Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran of Unaltered Augsburg Confession, religious authority and civil law met at a crossroads. A church’s right to autonomy stood at odds with a defamation victim’s right to a remedy. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a religious actor is not liable for statements that are made in the context of a church disciplinary proceeding when they are disseminated only to members of the church. The majority found that adjudicating a defamation claim in this context would excessively entangle the court with religion and therefore violate the First Amendment. Because the court did not apply neutral principles of law, which allow a court to adjudicate claims without touching religious doctrine, and because the court did not address the defamation claim on a statement-by-statement basis, its decision gave great deference to religious institutions.
This Note begins by exploring the history and evolution of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in the United States, including its current status in Minnesota. It then discusses the facts and procedure of Pfeil and outlines the rationale for the majority and dissenting opinions. Next, it analyzes the court’s decision and argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court ignored its own guidelines and extended the scope of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to a level beyond what United States Supreme Court jurisprudence requires. Finally, it concludes that the Pfeil holding essentially gives a religious actor an absolute privilege to defame in church disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, this Note suggests that the court should have used neutral principles of law, without invoking the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, to determine which statements could be adjudicated.