The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held in State v. Lopez-Ramos that an interpreter’s translation of a defendant’s foreign language statements during a police interrogation did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. The Lopez-Ramos court applied the language conduit theory to determine an interpreter’s translated statements were attributable to the defendant. Finally, the court concluded that because the defendant was the declarant of the statements, the statements were not hearsay.
This Paper begins with a historical overview of hearsay, the Confrontation Clause, the right to an interpreter, the limited right to confront an interpreter, and the common law development of Confrontation Clause tests in America. Then, it explains the facts and procedural posture of Lopez-Ramos. Next, this Paper argues that Lopez-Ramos’s approach to interpreters’ translated statements is based on flawed precedent. This Paper contends that Lopez-Ramos failed to acknowledge the changing demographics of the United States as justification for adopting a unified approach to this issue. Additionally, the majority’s misconstruction of language translation led to its distinguishing of Lopez-Ramos and applicable case law.
Therefore, to make the law more unified and protective of defendants’ rights, this Paper argues the court should adopt a disciplined approach: interpreters must be subject to cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause. Finally, this Paper concludes the Lopez-Ramos decision will likely lead to continued violations of foreign language speakers’ due process rights.