Statistics on mass incarceration and the disproportionate imprisonment of marginalized people demand a closer scholarly look at areas where sentences may be excessive. Fundamentally, the intuitive principle that punishment should fit the crime calls for constant, careful scrutiny of sentencing practices. In this light, it is worth examining Minnesota’s recent reforms to the convergence of its accomplice liability and felony-murder laws.
Accomplice liability occupies a fraught space between the moral horror of punishing the innocent and the universal conviction that certain wrongs warrant severe consequences. Opinions vary widely about where to draw the line. The felony-murder doctrine occupies a similar space, provoking strong emotions both for and against.
The Minnesota legislature recently signaled its stance on this divisive issue by enacting two pieces of legislation. In 2023, the Minnesota legislature amended the state’s accomplice liability statute to limit its application in felony murder cases. The expansive liability subdivision of this statute holds an aider and abettor liable for any additional offense committed in pursuance of the intended felony, provided the additional offense was “reasonably foreseeable . . . as a probable consequence” of the intended offense. The 2023 amendment (“the Amendment”) codified two exceptions to this standard: first-degree felony murder and second-degree unintentional felony murder. The legislature also passed a law (“Section 24”) making these reforms retroactive, thereby permitting individuals convicted under the prior, more expansive statute to petition for relief.
By limiting eligibility to those convicted of first- and second-degree felony murder, the legislature undermined the purpose of its reform. Minnesota’s current statutory framework for felony murder creates significant disparity in plea negotiations, allowing defendants who are convicted based on virtually identical facts to face different charges and sentences. As a result, individuals who are equally culpable as those convicted of first- or second-degree felony murder, but who were convicted of different offenses through the dynamics of plea negotiations, are ineligible to petition for relief under Section 24.
This Note argues that, while the Amendment and Section 24 represent progressive and necessary reforms to an overly broad standard, they are insufficient. The legislature fell short of its intent by narrowing the scope of liability only modestly and limiting eligibility for relief to those convicted of first- or second-degree felony murder. The Amendment should be reformed to include all homicide convictions as exceptions to the expansive liability standard. Likewise, Section 24 should be expanded to include those convicted under other homicide statutes whose legal and factual circumstances are substantially equivalent to the felony-murder offenses the legislature sought to remedy.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the history and development of these reforms. Part II surveys the scholarly discourse on the moral principles underlying accomplice liability and felony murder doctrines, setting the stage for Part III, which situates the Amendment and Section 24 within this framework and examines these reforms. Part IV presents a case study to demonstrate the real-world effects of the shortcomings of Section 24, and Part V proposes reforms to both Section 24 and the Amendment to remedy it.