In 2017, the Minnesota Legislature enacted statute section 171.177, which required blood and urine tests to determine blood alcohol concentrations be supported by a valid search warrant. Under this statute, drivers subjected to a warranted chemical test may lawfully refuse to submit fluid samples and thwart the administration of the chemical test. Thus, drivers suspected of DWI must decide whether they will comply with the search warrant and submit a fluid sample that may adversely affect their interests in subsequent criminal proceedings or, alternatively, exercise the lawful option of refusal. Despite this critical and binding decision, in State v. Rosenbush, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to extend Minnesota’s Constitutional limited right to counsel to warranted chemical tests. The Court’s decision rendered irrelevant, in effect, its previous holding in Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety recognizing a state constitutional limited right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing pursuant to Minnesota’s implied consent law.
This note first reviews the history of implied consent laws, with a particular focus on Minnesota’s implied consent law. Next, it reviews the history and objectives behind the protection of the right to counsel under both the United States’ and Minnesota’s Constitutions. It then provides a synopsis of State v. Rosenbush by considering the holding and reasoning employed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court, and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s dissenting opinion. Lastly, it concludes that the statute at issue in Rosenbush is flawed and explores how the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning fails to adequately support its holding.
This note suggests that the reasoning behind the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Rosenbush is inconsistent with precedent. Rosenbush frustrates the general principles of the limited right to counsel recognized in Friedman by denying a driver suspected of DWI access to counsel prior to the deciding whether he or she will submit to the warranted blood or urine test. Additionally, this note suggests that Minnesota Statute section 171.177 is generally inconsistent with the search warrant requirement insofar as it affords drivers the legal option to decline a warranted test. These inconsistencies produce a new, unique decision presented to drivers and create additional problems with regards to Minnesota’s limited right to counsel.