Note
42 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 320 (2016)

Property Law: The Crossroads of Capacity and Livability: A Green Light to Neighborhood Opposition as a Factual Basis for Denying Conditional Use Permits—RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington

By
Diane B. Galatowitsch

Throughout the history of zoning in America, laws have operated to balance the interests of government, developers, and homeowners to develop optimal living environments and maintain property values through a fair process. Zoning laws reflect the socially and culturally constructed “societal consensus” regarding what land uses are “normal and expected, decent, and desirable.” While developers, homeowners, and governments alike encouraged the adoption of zoning ordinances in the early twentieth century, the appropriate degree of local discretion in the zoning process continues to be disputed to this day.

Conditional use permit (CUP) processes were adopted to enable greater discretion in zoning. However, increasing local discretion created controversial issues: How much discretion should a local governing body have in zoning decisions? What is an arbitrary decision? What is the relative authority of a zoning ordinance versus a comprehensive plan? Understanding the evolution of American zoning illuminates the continued efforts of state legislatures and courts to limit the discretion of local governing bodies in order to improve predictability and efficiency in the zoning process for private property owners.

In RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that it was within a city’s discretion to deny a request for a CUP to expand an assisted living facility because increased traffic volume would “injure the neighborhood or otherwise harm the public health, safety, and welfare.” The court found that evidence of prospective traffic volume would exacerbate existing traffic concerns, as expressed by neighborhood opposition testimony. However, the neighborhood concerns were not substantiated by additional evidence.

This case note begins by tracing the development of CUP processes as a tool for flexibility in zoning law. Then, this note discusses the facts and the court’s rationale in the RDNT decision. Next, it argues that by conflating traffic capacity and livability issues, the court deviated from precedent that prohibits neighborhood opposition testimony from being the sole basis to deny a CUP. Finally, this note concludes that the unfettered use of neighborhood opposition testimony creates barriers to the development of critical services for vulnerable Minnesotans and undermines a process intended to balance property interests.