The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held in State v. Chute that evidence obtained without a warrant from a plain-sight investigation of a person’s driveway, which is impliedly open to the public, is the result of an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, must be suppressed. Applying the Dunn factors, the majority found the driveway of a house to be within the house’s curtilage, which is protected from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. Even though the driveway was impliedly open to the public and the police officer could reasonably surmise, from a plain view of the driveway, that it was storing a stolen camper, the majority held that the officer could not stay on the driveway to verify the camper’s identity. The court decided to exclude all evidence regarding the stolen camper without considering that the officer would have inevitably discovered that the camper was stolen, even if he did not engage in any unlawful conduct.
This case note begins by exploring the history of the right to be free from unreasonable searches by the government in America. In doing so, it visits the exclusionary rule—derived from the Fourth Amendment—and some of the relevant jurisprudence applying the exceptions and elaborations of the rule. This case note then discusses the facts and procedural history of Chute and explains the court’s reasoning for its decision. Next, it argues that the court misapplied federal precedent, missed an opportunity to apply the inevitable discovery rule, and deviated from Minnesota’s prior precedent in applying the exclusionary rule to the facts of Chute. This argument leads to the conclusion that the court’s ruling will create unreasonable difficulties for prosecution in the future.