“A statesman gains little by the arbitrary exercise of ironclad authority upon all occasions that offer[.] A little concession, now and then, where it can do no harm is the wiser policy.”
Partisan gridlock at the Minnesota State Capitol inevitably heads south along a well-worn path from the Cass Gilbert-designed capitol building to the Ramsey County District Court’s classic art deco structure. During my tenure as Second Judicial District Chief Judge, I presided over two of these gridlock cases: Brayton v. Pawlenty in 2010 and In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of Minnesota in 2011. Despite the gravity of the constitutional issues at stake in these cases, only the first resulted in a substantive decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The procedural posture and actions of the coordinate branches that ultimately resolved the 2005 state government shutdown and the 2011 budget crisis resulted in supreme court rulings that left the ultimate constitutional issue of whether the judicial branch can order disbursements from the state treasury unresolved.
The lack of prior appellate level review in these cases was put on full display in the most recent government gridlock conflict, Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate v. Dayton. In that case, when then-Chief Judge John Guthmann noted that no appellate court had ever passed judgment on the legality of court ordered temporary funding, one party grasping for an argument said, “[w]ell, it’s the law of Ramsey County.” Though it is unlikely that Chief Judge Guthmann found the argument particularly persuasive, it underscores the lack of clarity in this area of Minnesota constitutional law. However, unlike these earlier cases, Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate did reach the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2017, and its decision finally gave some guidance on how district courts should respond to future government gridlock and what powers the Minnesota Constitution confers on each branch. The decision, however, rests on specific facts relating to the amount of operating funds available to the legislature prior to the start of the next regularly scheduled session and judicial restraint principles. That case will be discussed later in this article.
Part II of this article briefly describes the Minnesota state budgeting process. Part III provides an overview of earlier Minnesota state government shutdowns. Part IV summarizes the procedural history in the Brayton and In re Temporary Funding. Part V describes Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate and discusses the challenges of balancing public interests with the demands of the Minnesota Constitution. Part VI concludes with a warning that the “law of Ramsey County” is evolving, and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate makes it less likely that future Ramsey County chief judges will authorize expenditures from the state treasury in the event of a shutdown. It also makes it likely that if funding is judicially ordered, it will be far narrower in scope. Finally, this article also suggests that Minnesota would be better served by adopting a default budget statute, such as those used in Wisconsin and Rhode Island, rather than continuing with the threat of shutdowns.