Article
49 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 177 (2023)

The Theoretical and Practical Shortcomings of Necessitating Appreciation for Punishment—Madison v. Alabama, 139 S.Ct. 718 (2019)

By
Martin Sandberg

In Madison v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of individuals who have no recollection of the crimes that they committed. In reaching their conclusion, the Court set forth that the determinant of whether the execution may proceed is whether the death-row-inmate is competent—being able to appreciate why the state has sought capital punishment.

Although this ruling is facially consistent with precedent, the rationale employed by the Court relies on a skewed interpretation of retributivism that insufficiently appreciates both the victim’s perspective and the societal perspective of the retributive value in the prescribed punishment, while overvaluing the importance of expiating the offender’s guilt. Furthermore, the Court, in reaching their decision, relied on a moralistic explanation for why those who lack competency may not be executed, arguing that it would “offend[] humanity.” This begs the question whether any legitimate justification exists for the criminal punishment of those who are not of sound mind, regardless of the offense.

This Case Note will begin by briefly summarizing the main theories of punishment that have guided lawmakers throughout history. It will then survey the history of the death penalty, emphasizing how capital punishment has been limited by the Eighth Amendment when interacting with the insane and the mentally incompetent. Next, this Case Note will discuss the facts of Madison and elaborate on the rationale the Court gave in reaching its conclusion that those who cannot remember their crime may still be executed. This Case Note goes on to argue that despite reaching the correct conclusion, the Court advocates for a confused test, which relies on a skewed interpretation of retributivism and exacerbates the conflation of insanity and incompetency (which has been compounded for the better part of two decades). Finally, this Case Note concludes with a discussion of how the Court’s rationale leaves little justification for the punishment of the mentally incompetent in any capacity and provides possible alternatives to the “rational understanding” test that would better effectuate the purposes of punishment, and thwart the repercussions of the currently promulgated test for future cases.