Imagine a scenario in which a city is in unrest; a man has been killed at the hands of police officers, so protestors have been filling the streets for days, demanding change. In the midst of a protest, a semi-truck enters a closed road and barrels through thousands of protestors. The driver is taken into custody. Law enforcement officers hold an impromptu press conference to inform the city, although the conference is closed to the public because of a global pandemic. In the press conference, the officers state that a man has been taken into custody for swerving into the crowds, and he has ties to a right-wing extremist group; however, the investigation is ongoing. The media promptly reports on these official statements to amplify this relevant government investigation to the public. Once the man is released from custody, he wants to sue the media for defamation—he is not a member of a right-wing extremist group, and the collision was an accident. Should the media be liable for reporting the officials’ defamatory statements, especially those of public concern? Before the Minnesota Supreme Court extended the fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover official news conferences in Larson v. Gannett Co., media organizations could have been liable just for republishing the officers’ defamatory statements.
What if, instead of just republishing the officers’ statements, the media reported that the man was not only brought into custody, but was also arrested and charged because he intended to run over the protestors? That exaggerated report, while loosely based on information garnered from the news conference, would not be a fair and accurate representation of the officers’ statements. Should the report still be privileged? If not, how should the court determine when exaggerations go too far? The Larson court had to grapple with these exact questions as they established a new inquiry to determine whether a report is fair and accurate.
Larson is a case about defamation, an individual’s ability to recover, and the power of the media. In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court extended the fair and accurate reporting privilege—for the first time—to protect media publications “that accurately and fairly summarize statements about a matter of public concern made by law enforcement officers during an official press conference and in an official news release.” This privilege relieves a media company of liability for publishing defamatory statements spoken by officials. The power of this privilege is both encouraging and frightening. On one hand, protecting the media from liability may serve public interest by advancing and unveiling corrupt government practices. On the other hand, if not contained, this privilege may advance the media’s ability to report disinformation without repercussion. Even worse, the privilege could prevent individuals from recovering for their damaged reputation—a right guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution.
This Paper begins with an explanation of the origins of defamation law and the fair and accurate reporting privilege, and it presents the factual and procedural history of the Larson case. The Analysis argues that the court correctly extended the privilege’s scope per precedent and policy and established a comprehensive test that theoretically balances an individual’s and the media’s conflicting interests. However, by remanding the case, there remains a lack of clear boundaries concerning what constitutes a fair and accurate report. While the court reasonably protected the media for public benefit, an individual’s ability to recover for his or her tarnished reputation may have been diminished.